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Margot E. Salomon∗ 
 
1. Introduction 
This Chapter explores bases for assigning positive duties of international assistance and 
cooperation to fulfil socio-economic rights in the world.1 A difficulty at present is that states 
can only be said to have imprecise obligations to fulfil socio-economic rights beyond their 
borders: they are largely aggregated duties of an undifferentiated international community 
(to use Philip Alston’s term), to cooperate in addressing hunger, malnutrition and related 
deprivations that find expression in human rights treaties. 
There are two main benefits that could come from determining the bases for assigning 
obligations in this area. First, clarity as to the scope of obligations of international assistance and 
cooperation could compel states to act in order to give them effect. Second, it would facilitate 
the determination of a breach of an international obligation of a state or states and thus 
responsibility for an internationally wrongful act. International responsibility could be 
attributed as a result of an action or omission – things states have and have not done to 
contribute to securing socio-economic rights elsewhere. Insofar as all states are bound by 
obligations of international cooperation under the United Nations (UN) Charter,2 and states 
∗ Dr Margot E. Salomon is Acting Director at the Centre for the Study of Human Rights, London School of 
Economics and Political Science where she also directs the Laboratory for Advanced Research on the Global 
Economy, and is Associate Professor in the Law Department. This Chapter is adapted from the extended 
coverage found in the work M.E. Salomon, ‘Deprivation, Causation and the Law of International Cooperation’, 
in M. Langford, W. Vandenhole, M. Scheinin and W. van Genugten (eds.), Global Justice, State Duties: The 
Extraterritorial Scope of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2013), 
259. 
1 Although the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has not formally elaborated any 
distinction between obligations of ‘international assistance’ and of ‘cooperation’, international assistance tends 
to be equated with the transfer of resources between states, as well as at times with technical support. 
International cooperation is understood more broadly, encompassing requirements of separate and joint action 
towards the realisation of socio-economic rights, including through the creation of an internationally enabling 
environment conducive to those ends. More recent instruments, such as the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities, New York,13 December 2006, in force 3 May 2008, 2515 UNTS 3, but also the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, New York,20 November 1989, in force 2 September 1990, 1577 
UNTS 3 (CRC), as well as the Declaration on the Right to Development, UN Doc. A/RES/41/128, Annex, 
UNGAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 186, UN Doc. A/RES/41/53 (1986), refer only to international 
cooperation in the achievement of the relevant rights therein, reflecting the preference of high-income countries 
to do away with the idea that resource transfer constitutes a legal obligation. 
2 Charter of the United Nations, San Francisco, 26 June 1945, in force 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS 16. 
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party to the relevant treaties addressing economic, social and cultural rights are bound by 
obligations of international assistance and/or cooperation,3 a central task that remains is to 
identify the basis or bases upon which duties might be disaggregated and thus more clearly 
assigned. 
When it comes to positive duties to fulfil socio-economic rights, causation may provide a 
basis for assigning obligations of international assistance and cooperation, however it hardly 
exhausts the possible grounds in this regard. States acting singly or jointly need not have 
caused harm in order to be under a positive duty to address the non-fulfilment of socio-
economic rights elsewhere, nor in order to be held responsible for an internationally wrongful 
act derived from a failure to comply with a human rights obligation to assist and cooperate 
internationally.  
Although it may be difficult to conclude that there exists a legally binding obligation for a 
given state to provide any particular form of material assistance to any other specific state(s), 
decades of UN consideration and standard setting in this and related areas have advanced 
interpretations of the obligation, whereby economic, financial, monetary and other policies 
should be designed in such a way as to avoid causing injury to the interests of other states and 
to the rights of their peoples,4 and moreover, should actively seek to address existing 
3 The sources of the obligation to cooperate internationally in the realisation of socio-economic rights can be 
traced back to the UN Charter’s emphasis on international cooperation in the achievement of social justice and 
human rights which forms a defining element of that foundational treaty (Articles 1(3), 55 and 56). The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, Paris, 10 December 1948, UN Doc. A/RES/217A(III), UNGAOR, 3rd Sess., UN 
Doc. A/810 (1948), recognises the significance of international cooperation in the realisation of human rights 
(Articles 22 and 28); and obligations of international assistance and cooperation in the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, New York, 16 December 1966, in force 3 January 1976, 993 UNTS 3 
(ICESCR) and similar formulations in the CRC, n. 1, form part of the general legal obligations in those widely 
ratified treaties: ICESCR, ibid., Article 2(1) provides that ‘[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant 
undertakes to take steps, individually and through international assistance and cooperation, especially economic 
and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the 
adoption of legislative measures.’ The 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development, n. 1, at Article 4(2) 
asserts the following: ‘[a]s a complement to the efforts of developing countries, effective international 
cooperation is essential in providing these countries with appropriate means and facilities to foster their 
comprehensive development.’ The UN Millennium Declaration,A/RES/55/2 (2000), UN GAOR, 55th Sess., 
Supp. No. 49, at 4, UN Doc. A/55/49 (2000), recognises a ‘shared responsibility’ for managing worldwide 
economic and social development. International cooperation for human rights has found its most recent 
reaffirmation in the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities of 2006, n. 1. 
4 P. Alston and G. Quinn, ‘The Nature and Scope of States Parties' Obligations under the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1987) 9(2) HRQ 156, at 191; see generally, M. Bulajić, Principles of 
International Development Law: Progressive Development of the Principles of International Law Relating to the 
New International Economic Order, 2nd ed. (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993); M.E. Salomon, 




                                                          
deprivations.5 I have elsewhere explored the former issue whereby international policies 
that impact for example on the right to food and on the right to an adequate standard of 
living, are concerned with possible breaches of obligations to ‘respect’ socio-economic rights 
elsewhere (i.e.: do no harm).6 This Chapter, for its part, addresses the parameters of a state’s 
obligations to ‘fulfil’ socio-economic rights beyond its own borders. 
When seeking to confront deprivation, obligations to fulfil socio-economic rights beyond 
borders are not limited to the transfer of financial resources and related aid. Although in 
this area the strongest argument regarding the role of individual states may be for a general 
duty amongst developed states to provide 0.7 per cent gross national income (GNI) in 
official development assistance,7 states also have duties when acting collectively, and 
through myriad methods beyond the transfer of resources. These could include addressing 
trade protectionism by industrialised states,8 as well as the policies of importing states that 
fuel resource-cursed countries9 including international corruption10 and support for illicit 
financial flows out of poor countries through tax havens and secrecy jurisdictions.11 A failure to 
comply with the obligation of international cooperation for the realisation of human rights 
5 Salomon, ibid. 
6 Salomon, ‘Deprivation, Causation and the Law of International Cooperation’, n. *. 
7 Notwithstanding the various arguments questioning the benefits of aid, see, among others, D. Moyo, Dead Aid 
(London: Allen Lane [Penguin Books], 2009); R.C. Riddell, Does Foreign Aid Really Work? (Oxford: OUP, 
2008). 
8 See I. Goldin and K. Reinert, Globalization for Development: Trade, Finance, Aid, Migration, and Policy 
(New York/Washington, DC: World Bank/Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), at 66, 75: ‘[w]hat are the costs of trade 
protectionism for the developing world? A number of studies have tried to assess this. To take one example, the 
World Bank has considered the impact of a “pro poor” trade liberalization scenario. This scenario involves only 
tariff reductions and agricultural subsidies reform. The welfare gains to developing countries of this liberalization 
scenario are estimated to be over US$250 billion in 2003 prices. This is four times the value of foreign aid. (…) The 
possibility of exports helping to alleviate poverty is significantly curtailed by trade protectionism in rich 
countries. This occurs in the form of tariffs, subsidies, quotas, standards, and regulations. (…) Rich-country 
protectionism poses a significant barrier to poverty alleviation, not to mention the overall participation of the 
developing world in the global economy.’ 
9 For an overview and sources on the correlation between the export of high-value extractive resources such as 
oil, gas, metals and gems, and curses such as authoritarianism, corruption, conflict and economic dysfunction, 
see L. Wenar, ‘Clean Trade in Natural Resources: A Policy Framework for Importing States and Multinationals 
in the Extractive Industries’ (2010) at www.cleantrade.org/policy_brief.pdf. 
10 Ibid. at 7: ‘[t]he Netherlands allowed tax deductions on bribes to foreign officials until 2006. It was not until 
2009 that Britain successfully prosecuted a foreign corruption case. “Facilitation payments” are still permitted by 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Korea and the US. Export credit agencies in many [resource] importing 
states fund and insure firms that pay off local officials.’ See, further, P. Maass, Crude World: The Violent 
Twilight of Oil (London: Peter Lane [Penguin Books], 2009). As for recent developments, note the illegality of 
facilitation payments and the extraterritorial reach of the United Kingdom’s Bribery Act 2010 c. 23, in force 1 
July 2011. 
11 See D. Kar and D. Cartwright-Smith, ‘Illicit Financial Flows from Africa: Hidden Resource for 
Development’ (Global Financial Integrity, 2010), www.gfintegrity.org, at 1: ‘[t]his massive flow of illicit money 
out of Africa is facilitated by a global shadow financial system comprising tax havens, secrecy jurisdictions, 
disguised corporations, anonymous trust accounts, fake foundations, trade mispricing, and money laundering 
techniques. The impact of this structure and the funds it shifts out of Africa is staggering.’ See also N. Shaxson, 
Treasure Islands: Tax Havens and the Men Who Stole the World (London: The Bodley Head, 2011). 
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can also be found in a global policy of the past four decades that has been marked by gross 
inequality in wealth and income12 under a scheme that one commentator pointedly refers to 
as ‘accumulation by dispossession’.13 Cooperative conduct to fulfil human rights can take the 
form of domestic regulatory measures and policies with international effect or of international 
measures and policies.  
The obligations of which we speak were not borne of globalisation; the treaties that 
underpinned the new world order in 1945 underscored 70 years ago that cooperation was 
essential to the establishment of a peaceful and just world. That said, the harms of 
globalisation and its attendant institutions reinforce the current significance of obligations of 
international assistance and cooperation to the ends of socio-economic justice. The forces of 
globalisation compel the cosmopolitan ethic that animates these obligations today. 
 
2. Bases for assigning obligations of international assistance and cooperation 
2.1 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Committee 
In a state-centric system that remains largely circumscribed territorially, international 
human rights law generally recognises that the primary obligation to fulfil socio-economic 
rights rests with the state acting domestically. Whereas extraterritorial obligations to ‘respect’ 
and ‘protect’ socio-economic rights exist alongside those of the domestic state, international 
action to fulfil socio-economic rights by states other than the rights-holders’ own, where 
required, is often said to be based on a secondary or subsidiary duty in those circumstances 
where the primary duty-bearer is unable or unwilling to fulfil said obligations. However, 
this latter point should not be overstated: the obligation to cooperate internationally to fulfil 
socio-economic rights is determined on the basis of the failure of rights-holders to exercise 
their rights14 and since socio-economic rights remain so dramatically unmet globally we 
12 See M.E. Salomon, ‘Why Should it Matter that Others Have More: Poverty, Inequality and the Potential 
of International Human Rights Law’, Proceedings of the Oxford University Conference on International Law 
and Global Justice (2011)  37(5)  RIS 2137. 
13 D. Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: OUP, 2005), 160 et seq. Harvey’s accumulation of 
dispossession comprises four main features: privatisation and commodification; financialisation; the 
management and manipulation of crisis; and various forms of s tate redistributions in wealth and income that 
flow from lower to upper classes. 
14 The significance of distinguishing between whether the domestic state is unable or unwilling to comply 
with its obligations is important in determining its own responsibility for failure to meet its human rights 
obligations, inability giving rise to possible defences that might preclude wrongfulness. However the distinction 
bears no relevance as regards the assignment of secondary duties to external states, which is determined on the 
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should best understand these obligations amongst external states to remedy the state of 
affairs as complementary to those of the right-holder’s own state.15 To ignore the existence of 
an obligation to  take remedial international action would be to hollow out the value of the 
positive obligation of international cooperation for the realisation of socio-economic rights. It 
is difficult, however, to determine when an obligation of international assistance and/or 
cooperation has been breached, thereby giving rise to a claim of international legal 
responsibility, because there is a paucity of judicial elucidation as to what directives 
would indicate that a given state was required to act in a particular situation, and how, in 
order to contribute to fulfilling socio-economic rights in the world.  
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR or Committee) has given 
little detailed direction as to the content of the obligation of international assistance and 
cooperation under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR or Covenant),16 the general human rights treaty on the subject of socio-
economic rights. On the terms of the treaty itself, states that might be said to have particular 
duties are those with economic and technical capacity. This basis is deduced from the 
‘obligation of all States parties to take steps, individually and through international 
assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical’, towards the full realisation 
of the rights.17 Arguably, it can be further deduced from Article 23 of the Covenant that a 
particular duty also rests with states that are most influential when it comes to the ‘conclusion of 
conventions and the adoption of recommendations’ that would propel ‘international action for 
the achievement of the rights’ recognised in the Covenant.18 
Only one general basis for assigning obligations has so far been adopted by the Committee: 
that international cooperation for development and thus for the realisation of economic, 
social and cultural rights, while an obligation of all states, ‘is particularly incumbent upon 
basis of the failure of the rights-holders to exercise their rights. See L. Wenar, ‘Responsibility and Severe 
Poverty’, in T.W. Pogge (ed.), Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right: Who Owes What to the Very Poor? 
(Oxford: OUP/UNESCO, 2007), 255, at 265. Analogously, the responsibility of the international community to 
protect people from gross violations of human rights is triggered by the ‘manifest failure’ of national authorities 
to afford protection and not whether that failure is due to a government’s inability or unwillingness. 2005 World 
Summit Outcome, UN Doc. A/RES/60/1 (24 October 2005), para. 139. I thank Jennifer Welsh for bringing this 
aspect of paragraph 139 to my attention. 
15 Salomon, Global Responsibility for Human Rights, n. 4 above, at 189-95. 
16 ICESCR, n. 3. 
17 Article 2(1) ICESCR, n. 3. On technical assistance, see also Articles 22 and 23.  
18 Article 23 ICESCR, n .  3 : ‘[t]he States Parties to the present Covenant agree that international action for 
the achievement of the rights recognized in the present Covenant includes such methods as the conclusion 
of conventions, the adoption of recommendations, the furnishing of technical assistance and the holding of 
regional meetings and technical meetings for the purpose of consultation and study organized in conjunction with 
the Governments concerned.’ 
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those States in a position to assist’, a point to which we will return.19 A second and merely 
hortatory reference indicates that the inability of people in developing countries to exercise 
their socio-economic rights is ‘of common concern to all countries’,20 the Committee’s 
pronouncement on the existence of a ‘common concern’ implying an erga omnes or indeed 
an omnium erga omnes obligation.21  
 
2.2 Causation as a basis for assigning obligations of international cooperation 
The allocation of injury or loss to a wrongful act requires the existence of a causal link that also 
meets the criterion of, for example, directness, foreseeability or proximity.22 A finding of 
international responsibility may subsequently (as part of or separately from the reparations 
owed) indicate a basis for assigning obligations of international assistance and cooperation: a 
state or states found to have caused harm could reasonably be said thereby to have particular 
duties of international cooperation when it comes to giving effect to its (treaty) obligations 
in the area of socio-economic rights. However, concluding that causation should offer the sole 
or primary basis for assigning obligations of international assistance and cooperation is 
unduly restrictive. States acting singly or jointly need not have caused harm in order to be 
under a positive duty to address the non-fulfilment of socio-economic rights elsewhere, nor in 
order to be held responsible for an internationally wrongful act derived from a failure to 
comply with an obligation to assist and cooperate internationally. Notably, as per Article 
2(1) of the ICESCR as elsewhere, they are under a prescriptive obligation to act towards the 
fulfilment socio-economic rights, regardless of causation.23 
19 CESCR, General Comment No. 3, ‘The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations’ (Article 2(1) of the Covenant) 
(5th Sess., 1990), UN Doc. E/1991/23 (1991) Annex III, para. 14. 
20 CESCR, General Comment No. 14, ‘The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health’ (Article 12) 
(22nd Sess., 2000), UN Doc. E/C12/2000/4 (2000), para. 38. 
21 ‘[O]bligations erga omnes, according to which there are some obligations with respect to which every State has 
a right to insist on their observance; and that of obligations omnium, according to which some obligations are 
incumbent upon all States without exception’. On obligations omnium, see, generally, P. Weil, ‘Towards 
Relative Normativity in International Law’ (1983) 77(3) AJIL 413. The definition just provided is from J. 
Tasioulas, ‘In Defence of Relative Normativity: Communitarian Values and the Nicaragua Case’ (1996) 16(1) 
OJLS 85, at 86. 
22 Commentary to the Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, ILC Yearbook 
2001/II(2) (ARSIWA Commentary), Commentary to Article 31, para. 10. . The ILC remarks: ‘[i]n other words, 
the requirement of a causal link is not necessarily the same in relation to every breach of an international 
obligation. (…) The notion of a sufficient causal link which is not too remote is embodied in the general 
requirement in article 31 that the injury should be in consequence of the wrongful act, but without the 
addition of any particular qualifying phrase.’ (Ibid.) 
23 M.E. Salomon and I. Seiderman, ‘The Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the 
6 
 
                                                          
Insofar as causation might shape the scope of subsequent obligations, a broader reading of 
the causation doctrine could have obligations assigned on the basis of the contribution that a 
state has made through its conduct to the emergence of the problem (historically or recently) 
and/or to the persistence of the problem. Obligations of international cooperation could be 
determined on the basis of the relative power it wields in international affairs manifested as 
influence over the direction of international trade, investment, taxation, finance, 
environmental policy and development cooperation. 
When it comes to the obligations of states other than the right-holder’s own to respect and 
protect socio-economic rights, in addition to direct causation, international legal 
responsibility could be attributed on the grounds that the actions or omissions (whether 
international or internal decisions with external effect) had reasonably foreseeable 
international consequences24 and/or because of the lack of due diligence undertaken to 
prevent the violation or to respond to it as required.25 In the case of indivisible harms 
whereby establishing direct causal links between the actions of a particular state and its 
impact on the exercise of rights can be difficult, causation determined via a ‘but for’ test and 
an assessment as to whether sufficient precaution was taken can be important elements in 
attributing responsibility. If we take the case of biofuels: global food prices would not have 
skyrocketed but for the European Union and United States (US) policies on production.26 
Similarly if we consider agricultural subsidies, in the United States–Cotton case brought by 
Brazil against the US, the World Trade Organization (WTO) Panel, as upheld by the 
Appellate Body, found that the world market price for cotton on which so many developing 
country farmers rely would have increased significantly had it not been for the US subsidies 
provided to its cotton producers, users and/or exporters.27 In short, the violations of the socio-
area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, Special Section on International Law, Human Rights and the 
Global Economy: Innovations and Expectations for the 21st Century, Guest Editor M.E. Salomon, (2012) 3(4) 
GP 458. 
24 See, Munaf v. Romania, Communication No. 1539/2006, Human Rights Committee, Admissibility and 
Merits, UN Doc. CCPR/C/96/D/1539/2006 (21 August 2009), para. 14.2. 
25 Velásquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, IACtHR, (Ser. C) No. 4 (1988), para. 172.  
26 Salomon, ‘Deprivation, Causation and the Law of International Cooperation’, n. *, at 263-72. 
27 The price suppression claim by the Panel – upheld by the Appellate Body – was determined via the application 
of a ‘but for’ test. In upholding Brazil’s claim, the Panel examined whether the world market price for cotton 
would have increased significantly ‘but for these subsidies’. United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, 
Appellate Body Report, WT/DS267/AB/R, adopted 3 March 2005, para. 763(c)(i)(B). The subsidies paid by the 
United States to its 25,000 cotton farmers exceed the entire GNI of virtually every cotton exporting country in 
West and Central Africa. B. McGivern, WTO Appellate Body Report: United States-Cotton Case Summary, 10 
June 2008, White and Case LLP, Geneva. In Benin alone, the fall in cotton prices in 2001-2002 was linked to an 
increase in poverty from 37 per cent to 59 per cent. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human 
Development Report 2005: International Cooperation at a Crossroads: Aid, Trade and Security in an Unequal 
World (New York: OUP, 2005), 131. 
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economic rights abroad would not have occurred but for the actions and omissions of the 
relevant states, including their prima facie failures to exercise due diligence in order to 
prevent the harms.28 These indirect causal links could offer a basis for subsequently assigning 
particular duties of international assistance and cooperation, including as part of reparations 
where a state is found internationally responsible based on the failure to exercise due 
diligence. 
Indirect causation might also be relevant insofar as the very design of existing global 
arrangements causes and/or fails to remedy widespread deprivation. On this account, the 
failure is that of the international political economy as a whole, and all states – to greater or 
lesser degrees – are thereby responsible for ‘causing’ the harms and are duty-bound to 
remedy them.29 (That said, this structural thesis leads us back to having to disaggregate 
duties.) 
 
2.3 Historical responsibility as a basis for assigning obligations of international cooperation 
On this account contemporary obligations would be assigned on the basis of historical 
responsibility for past exploitation. Although not a precondition, the harmful effects of past 
actions may be traceable to current deprivations in the form of the non-fulfilment of socio-
economic rights and/or can be shown to have benefited the external state over time. It 
follows that, initially, a form of corrective justice should be forthcoming to the extent that 
certain countries have been disadvantaged as a result of past injustices,30 and on the 
28 Due diligence could require ex ante impact assessments on cross-border or global impacts. In the Pulp Mills 
case the ICJ concludes that it ‘may now be considered a requirement under general international law to 
undertake an environmental impact assessment where there is a risk that the proposed industrial activity may 
have a significant adverse impact in a transboundary context’. Moreover, due diligence would not be considered 
to have been exercised where there was liable to be a negative effect and the relevant party failed to undertake an 
impact assessment. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2010, 14, 
para. 204. As for international decision making – human rights treaty bodies regularly call upon states to prepare 
human rights impact assessments of the trade and investment agreements that they conclude, and call on other 
actors in urging the use of mechanisms for measuring human rights impact of their international policies: UN 
Committee on the Rights of the Child, concluding observations on El Salvador, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.232 
(2004), para. 48; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, concluding observation on 
Philippines, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/PHI/CO/6 (2006), para. 26, CESCR, ‘Statement on Globalization and 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, UN Doc. E/1999/22-E/C.12/1998/26 (1998); ch. VI, sect. A, para. 515, 
at para 7. 
29 See further, Salomon, Global Responsibility for Human Rights, n. 4; 1986 Declaration on the Right to 
Development, n. 1, Article 3(1): ‘[s]tates have the primary responsibility for the creation of national and 
international conditions favourable to the realization of the right to development.’ 
30 D. Shelton, ‘Describing the Elephant in the Room’, in J. Ebbesson and P. Okowa (eds.), Environmental Law and 
Justice in Context (Cambridge: CUP, 2009), 55, at 61. 
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principle that people should not benefit from their wrongdoing and should compensate those 
who have suffered as a result. The basis of historical responsibility takes a compensatory 
approach based on some determination of liability for contributing to a problem. Needless to 
say, it is a claim traditionally advanced by developing countries and is politically 
contentious.31 In practice, however, former colonial powers do tend to direct international 
assistance to their former colonies, in particular based on a moral sense of historical 
responsibility; recent empirical studies demonstrating the long-term effects of colonialism and 
slavery on current economic performance could provide a legal grounding.32 Historical 
responsibility as a relevant basis for assigning obligations of international assistance and 
cooperation should not preclude the adoption of other bases, including notably that of 
capacity. 
 
2.4 Capacity as a basis for assigning obligations of international cooperation 
As noted above, the CESCR has emphasised that particular obligations of international 
assistance and cooperation are incumbent on those states in ‘a position to assist’, and as such 
indicates capacity as a basis for assigning obligations. Capacity offers both a specific and a 
general requirement: specific in that it is one of the bases that points to the requisite 
international duty-bearers, and general in that it is a prerequisite to discharging any obligation. 
Thus, one could argue for example that historical responsibility should form a basis for 
assigning international obligations, but capacity would still be a necessary element in 
order to see that obligation fulfilled. 
A full examination of what constitutes capacity to assist is beyond the scope of this Chapter, 
however the list could include economic, technical and technological capacities, available 
resources, and influence, including in international decision-making processes.33 In the 
narrower context of providing disaster relief and humanitarian assistance in times of 
emergency, we see capacity as the basis for assigning obligations to cooperate. The CESCR 
refers to the requirement that ‘each State should contribute to this task to the maximum of 
31 It has been given considerable focus in climate change debates as part of ‘climate debt’ demands. See the 
submission by the state of Bolivia to the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action: Outcome of 
the World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth (April 2010). 
32 N. Nunn, ‘The Long-Term Effects of Africa's Slave Trades’ (2008) 123(1) QJE 139. 
33 See Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (2011), at www.maastrichtuniversity.nl, Principle 31; Salomon, Global Responsibility for 
Human Rights, n. 4, ch. 5: ‘Attributing Global Legal Responsibility’, 180. 
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its capacities’. Furthermore, all states are to fulfil their ‘collective responsibility’ due to the 
risk of the spread of disease across borders. In the case of humanitarian assistance, the 
dilemma of choosing amongst a multiplicity of possible duty-bearers is resolved by the 
Committee: the degree to which each state should assist depends on its individual 
(maximum) capacity – with the ‘economically developed states parties [having] a special 
responsibility (…) to assist the poorer developing states’.34 In the Genocide case, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) took the approach of devising allocative principles to 
identify state’s with the greatest duty to prevent genocide. Criteria included ‘the capacity to 
influence effectively’ (the action of persons likely to commit, or already committing, 
genocide) and the ‘geographical distance of the State concerned from the scene of the 
events’.35 
A turn to capacity and thus differentiated duties as a basis for assigning obligations in the area 
of socio-economic rights is bolstered by what one commentator sums up as the dissolution 
of the ‘traditional egalitarian fiction and the emergence of a new legal 
polycentricity’,36which has been brought to the fore by the principle of ‘common but 
differentiated responsibility’ (CBDR) in international environmental law. In advancing an 
ethic that certain countries will take the lead in meeting internationally agreed objectives, the 
approach based on CBDR serves to influence the interpretation of environmental 
instruments, as well as affirms the contemporary significance of global partnerships.37 The 
principle of CBDR is justified intellectually based on the reality of both historical differences 
in the contributions made by developed and developing states to global environmental 
problems, the responsibility of developed countries for present and future pursuit of sustainable 
development, differences in respective economic and technical capacity to tackle the 
problems, as well as different needs. Thus it translates into differentiated environmental 
34 CESCR, General Comment No. 14, n. 20, para. 40. 
35 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2007, 43, para. 430 (Genocide case). 
36 P.H. Sand, ‘The Evolution of International Environmental Law’, in D. Bodansky, J. Brunnée and E. Hey 
(eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (Oxford: OUP, 2007), 29, at 40. 
37 See Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I) (1992); 31 ILM 
874 (1992), Principle 7: ‘[s]tates shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and restore 
the health and integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem. In view of the different contributions to global environmental 
degradation, States have common but differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the 
responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the pressures their 
societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and financial resources they command’; UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, New York, 9 May 1992, in force 21 March 1994, 1771 UNTS 107, 
Article 3(1): ‘[t]he Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of 
humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate 
change and the adverse effects thereof.’ 
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standards set on the basis of the range of factors, including special needs and circumstances, 
future economic development of countries, and historical contributions to the creation of an 
environmental problem.38 
In international environmental law, the principle of CBDR does not in itself offer a basis 
for assigning obligations of international cooperation, nor for dividing duties amongst those 
states with the greater responsibilities. These are fleshed out in the provisions of a given 
instrument that differentiates specific duties by category of states.39 It is a principle that 
recognises that states should – for the range of reasons provided earlier – possess different 
duties, and underpins steps that allow for differential treatment to those ends. Its practical 
application can take the form of, for example, increased time to implement treaty 
commitments, exemptions, burden sharing through the allocation of funding, and the 
transfer of technology. CBDR might be said to offer a general principle of equity, with 
differential treatment concerned with the realisation of substantive equality over time aimed at 
enhancing the social and economic development of those worst-off in the world. As such, it 
seeks to provide remedial measures aimed at achieving what the drafters agree would be a more 
just society.40 In sum, although the principle of CBDR may represent merely ‘the nucleus of 
an emerging framework of global burden sharing’,41 it can be seen as part of a broader 
normative development in international law that requires action on the part of those ‘in a 
position to assist’. It also points to an emerging procedural requirement for states to 
coordinate with each other in the allocation of particular duties necessary to discharge their 
respective obligations to cooperate effectively.42 
38 The Centre for International Sustainable Development Law, ‘The Principle of Common but Differentiated 
Responsibilities: Origins and Scope’, Legal Brief for the World Summit on Sustainable Development 2002 
(Johannesburg, 26 August 2002), at http://cisdl.org/public/docs/news/brief_common.pdf. 
39 See for example, Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, in force 29 December 
1993, 1760 UNTS 79, Article 20(2): ‘[t]he developed country Parties shall provide new and additional 
financial resources to enable developing country Parties to meet the agreed full incremental costs to them of 
implementing measures which fulfil the obligations of this Convention and to benefit from its provisions.’ 
40 D. Shelton, ‘Equity’, in D. Bodansky, J. Brunne´ e and E. Hey (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International 
Environmental Law (Oxford: OUP, 2007), 639, at 659. 
41 J. Brunnée, ‘Climate Change, Global Environmental Justice and International Environmental Law’, in J. 
Ebbesson and P. Okowa (eds.), Environmental Law and Justice in Context (Cambridge: CUP, 2009), 316, at 
327; and see J. Scott and L. Rajamani, ‘EU Climate Change Unilateralism’ (2012) 23(2) EJIL 469, at 477: 
‘[a]lthough the CBDRRC [common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities] principle has 
come to play a pivotal role in international environmental law, the core content of the CBDRRC principle, as 
well as the nature of the obligation it entails, is deeply contested.’ 
42 See ‘Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States’, n. 33, Principle 30; O. De Schutter, A. 
Eide, A. Khalfan, M. Orellana, M.E. Salomon and I. Seiderman, ‘Commentary to the Maastricht Principles on 
the Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2012) 34(4) HRQ 
1084, at 1149; A. Khalfan, ‘Division of Responsibility Between States’, in M. Langford et. al. (eds.), Global 
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2.5 Capacity and the matter of cost 
When relying on those states with the capacity to assist in fulfilling obligations, the 
division of duties is determined also according to states that could most easily avert or 
redress the threat or violation to basic well-being in a given situation. The converse is that 
should it be too difficult for a state to avert or redress the human rights threat or violation, 
then there is no obligation to do so.43 A consideration of capacity as a basis for assigning 
obligations of international cooperation thus begs the subsequent question as to where the 
line is to be drawn. 
In meeting its positive obligations of international assistance and cooperation to fulfil socio-
economic rights beyond territory, the question arises as to what would constitute an 
unreasonable cost on the part of a state acting internationally. It might be assumed that a 
state having broadly secured a high level of socio-economic rights for its people is in a 
position to take steps to fulfil socio-economic rights abroad, perhaps requiring an expenditure 
of financial or other resources. This approach takes as its starting point that states can act in 
fulfilling rights elsewhere because socio-economic rights have been realised at home. Ooms 
and Hammonds recognise the risk that this approach invites when it comes to rights that are 
progressively realised and indeterminate. They argue with regard to the right to health for 
example, that in order to avoid a situation whereby high-income countries could endlessly 
refute their obligations of international assistance by referring to their domestic obligations to 
achieve the ‘moving target of the highest attainable standard of health’, any country that has 
realised the minimum essential level of health domestically is duty-bound to contribute to that 
same standard elsewhere before aiming for the (progressively realisable) highest attainable 
standard of health.44 
I would propose a more exacting test: a state that has not ensured the minimum essential level 
of rights at home could still be said to have positive obligations to fulfil the human rights of 
people outside its borders on the basis of an objective determination as to what constitutes the 
‘adequate and reasonable’ use of its ‘available resources’ towards the realisation of rights.45 A 
Justice, State Duties: The Extraterritorial Scope of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2013), 299. 
43 See Wenar on the ‘least-cost principle’: Wenar, ‘Responsibility and Severe Poverty’, n. 14, at 269. 
44 G. Ooms and R. Hammonds, ‘Taking Up Daniels’ Challenge: The Case for Global Health Justice’, (2010) 
12(1) HHR 29, at 36. 
45 The references to the requirement to use maximum available resources are found in Article 2(1) ICESCR, n. 3, 
and Article 4 CRC, n. 1. In a 2007 statement, the CESCR indicated that under a future communications 
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state that has not fulfilled the minimum essential levels of socio-economic rights at home might 
nonetheless be required to comply with its obligations to people elsewhere if, by objective 
criteria, it can be said to possess adequate resources. In circumstances whereby the state is 
deemed to possess the resources necessary to meet minimum standards at home and 
contribute to the fulfilment of rights in the world, it would be for that state to justify any 
retrogression in the exercise of the rights of its own citizens that occurs alongside the 
dispensation of foreign assistance.46 These tests may go some way to addressing the problem 
of multiplicity just touched on at least in the area of resource transfer: all states that have 
fulfilled basic socio-economic rights at home, or are determined objectively to possess 
adequate resources but have shown themselves unwilling to fulfil their minimum obligations 
at home, are all equally required to contribute to the fulfilment of rights elsewhere. The 
subsequent determination as to which foreign state(s) should assist which particular recipient 
state(s), and how, becomes merely a matter of coordination. 
At least two issues should be highlighted here: that eliminating deprivation globally is a 
manageable collective enterprise, and that the perpetuation of need is avoidable under just 
international institutions. Although mechanisms for financial global redistribution akin to the 
national welfare state do not exist at present,47 substantial improvements in the position and 
living conditions of the world’s poor are possible at small opportunity costs to the rich world. 
Doubling the wealth of all in the bottom two quintiles would take only 1.55 per cent of the 
wealth of the top 1 per cent of the human population;48 0.7 per cent of the global product, or 
less than 1 per cent of the combined GNIs of the high-income countries, is all that is needed 
to address the aggregate shortfall from the World Bank’s two US dollar-a-day poverty line.49 
procedure, it would apply an ‘adequate and reasonable’ test in determining whether a state party acting at the 
domestic level has failed to take steps to the maximum of its available resources in meeting its obligations under 
the Covenant. CESCR, ‘Statement on an Evaluation of the Obligations to Take Steps to the “Maximum 
Available Resources” under an Optional Protocol to the Covenant’ (38th Sess., 2007), UN Doc. E/C12/2007/1 
(2007), para. 8. The CESCR indicates that the requirement is for ‘principled policy-making’ to be undertaken. 
Article 8(4) of the new Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
directs the Committee in its examination of communications towards a reasonableness standard of review: 
‘[w]hen examining communications under the present Protocol, the Committee shall consider the reasonableness 
of the steps taken by the State Party in accordance with part II of the Covenant. In doing so, the Committee shall 
bear in mind that the State Party may adopt a range of possible policy measures for the implementation of the 
rights set forth in the Covenant.’ Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, 10 December 2008, in force 5 May 2013.  
46 CESCR, General Comment No. 3, n. 1 9 , para. 9: ‘any deliberately retrogressive measures (…) would 
require the most careful consideration and would need to be fully justified by reference to the totality of the 
rights provided for in the Covenant and in the context of the full use of the maximum available resources’. 
47 R.H. Wade, ‘Globalization, Growth, Poverty, Inequality, Resentment, and Imperialism’, in J. Ravenhill (ed.), 
Global Political Economy, 2nd ed. (Oxford: OUP, 2008), 373, at 403. 
48 T.W. Pogge, ‘Growth and Inequality: Understanding Recent Trends and Political Choices’ (2008) 55(1) 
Dissent, 66 at 72. 
49 Ibid., at 73. 
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A mere 0.1 per cent of the GNI of the sixty-six economies classified as high-income by the 
World Bank is all that would be required to meet what the CESCR considers to constitute the 
core obligations as regards the right to health.50 Because taken together funds are easily 
available, and because meeting global need requires resources beyond that of any one state, 
obligations of international cooperation (differentiated by capacity) need also include the 
collective duties of the appropriate members of the international community of states, in this 
case as regards the transfer of financial resources. 
It is immaterial to the finding of a breach of an obligation of conduct for a single state whose 
responsibility is in issue to claim that it could make little difference on its own in the 
prevention of a violation, even had it used all means reasonably at its disposal, as the ICJ 
has noted in a different context: ‘the more so since the possibility remains that the combined 
efforts of several states, each complying with its obligation to prevent, might have achieved 
the result [of averting the harm] (…) which the efforts of only one state were insufficient to 
produce’.51 In addition, although it is not certain that a given intervention would have 
prevented the harm, that actuality is irrelevant to establishing responsibility.52 In circumstances 
where more than one state is responsible, each state is separately responsible for conduct 
attributable to it and that responsibility is not diminished by the fact that it is not the only 
responsible state. This is equally the case in a situation where a single course of conduct is at 
the same time attributable to several states and is internationally wrongful for each of them.53 
The preliminary conclusions on this matter are twofold: on the one hand, we can recognise 
the existence of collective legal obligations while relying, so far, on an individualised 
regime of legal responsibility in the event of a breach of those obligations. On the other 
hand, the truly collective action required to fulfil this obligation might best invite the 
application of a standard of joint and several responsibility whereby the victim could claim 
for the full amount against any wrongdoing state, even if no one state is likely to be able 
adequately to compensate for the collective failure when it comes to reparations, and other 
methods will need to be devised. The responsible state will also have the option, in principle, 
of claiming against the other wrongdoing states for their contribution to the harm.54 As 
50 Ooms and Hammonds, ‘Taking Up Daniels Challenge’, n. 44, at 37. In December 2013, there were seventy-
five high-income economies: see http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications/country-and-lending-
groups#High_income. 
51 Genocide case, n. 35, para. 430. 
52 Ibid. Although the ICJ concluded in the Genocide case that it is not irrelevant to the determination of financial 
compensation since the actual damage could not be causally linked to the wrongdoing state. Ibid., para. 462. 
53 ARSIWA Commentary, n. 22, Commentary to Article 47. 
54 Nollkaemper and Jacobs highlight, however, that in practice, ‘the decentralized nature of the international 
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Nollkaemper and Jacobs rightly point out, when obligations require collective action, it is 
reasonable for shared responsibility to be implied in the event of a breach.55 The standard of 
joint and several responsibility is instructive, as Judge Simma explains in his separate 
Opinion in the Oil Platforms case: ‘on the one hand it recognizes the difficulty of a finding of 
responsibility where apportionment is impossible. On the other hand, it excludes as unfair a 
solution in which no one would be held responsible’.56  
The second issue warranting note is that poverty and the widespread violation of socio-
economic rights are avoidable through the creation of fairer international institutions,57 the 
imperative being to elaborate, interpret and apply international rules in a manner consistent 
with internationally accepted standards of decency, in many instances as articulated through 
human rights.58 International cooperation is not limited to the distribution of resources and 
goods, but also includes the establishment of just institutional procedural principles59 and a 
system of rules that distributes the consequential effects of the law fairly.60 
 
legal order, combined with the lack of courts with compulsory jurisdiction, suggests that the international legal 
order is much less conducive to application of joint and several responsibility’. P.A. Nollkaemper and D. Jacobs, 
‘Shared Responsibility in International Law: A Conceptual Framework’ (2013) 34(2) MIJIL 359 at 423. 
55 Ibid., at 394.  
56 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2003, 161, 
Separate Opinion of Judge Simma, para. 68. On joint and several responsibility see Salomon, ‘Deprivation, 
Causation and the Law of International Cooperation’, n. * above. See also P. d’Argent, ‘Reparation, Cessation, 
Assurances and Guarantees of Non-Repetition’, in P.A. Nollkaemper and I. Plakokefalos (eds.), Principles of 
Shared Responsibility in International Law: An Appraisal of the State of the Art (Cambridge: CUP, 2014); L.A. 
Kornhauser, ‘Incentives, Compensation, and Irreparable Harm’, in P.A. Nollkaemper and D. Jacobs (eds.), this 
volume, at ____; and A. van Aaken, ‘Shared Responsibilities in International Law: A Political Economy 
Analysis’, in P.A. Nollkaemper and D. Jacobs (eds.), this volume, at ____. 
57 See Pogge, ‘Growth and Inequality’, n. 48, at 73-4; T.M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). 
58 See Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States, n. 33, Principles 17 and 29(a). See also the 
work of R. Howse that points to the positive impact that would come to bear on poverty through changing the 
interpretative practices and culture surrounding the existing rules (especially integrating existing positive 
international human rights law into the interpretation of economic rules), over changes to the formal rules 
themselves. R. Howse, ‘Accountability Issues in International Economic Governance’, Conference on the 
Accountability for Human Rights Violations by International Organizations, International Law Association 
Belgian Branch, Brussels, March 2007 (on file with author); R. Howse, ‘Mainstreaming the Right to 
Development into International Trade Law and Policy at the World Trade Organization’, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub 
2/2004/17 (9 June 2004); R. Howse and R. Teitel, ‘Global Justice, Poverty, and the International Economic 
Order’, in S. Besson and J. Tasioulas (eds.), The Philosophy of International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2010), 437, at 
447. 
59 V. Zanetti, ‘Egalitarian Global Distributive Justice or Minimal Standard? Pogge's Position’, in A. Follesdal 
and T.W. Pogge (eds.), Real World Justice: Grounds, Principles, Human Rights, and Social Institutions (Berlin: 
Springer, 2005), 199, at 208; and see Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions, n. 57. 
60 Franck, ibid., at 8; Salomon, Global Responsibility for Human Rights, n. 4. For two proposals aimed at 
embedding systems of distributive justice (the consideration or adoption of which might themselves constitute 
giving effect to aspects of the obligation of international cooperation for the realisation of socio-economic 
rights), see the work of Thomas Pogge on the Health Impact Fund at www.healthimpactfund.org, and of Leif 
Wenar on Clean Trade at www.cleantrade.org. 
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3. Accountability 
Undoubtedly there currently exist accountability failures in the area of ensuring socio-
economic rights globally. There has been little done to address widescale violations of socio-
economic rights in a system, in large part, structured around redress for individual territorial 
victims of human rights violations. So far there is inadequate mobilisation in response to the 
CESCR’s view that poverty reflects ‘a massive and systemic breach’ of international 
human rights law.61 The adoption by the General Assembly of an Optional Protocol to the 
ICESCR in 200862 offers some possibilities of redress for the breach of obligations by those 
states other than the right-holders own, including when the obligations are shared among 
several states parties. Through its system of inter-state complaints,63 and the inquiry 
procedure triggered by reliable information indicating grave or systematic violations of 
Covenant rights,64 the Committee could address issues regarding the failure of a state (or 
states) to comply with their positive obligations of international cooperation in a manner that 
it cannot readily consider in the context of individual communications. 
Extraterritorial obligations, and notably international cooperation for development and thus 
for the realisation of economic, social and cultural rights, are understood both normatively 
and practically as essential to fulfilling the aspirations of many countries and the human 
rights of their peoples. Under the Optional Protocol there would seem to be no procedural 
bar to having, for example, a developing state, acting in its capacity as an injured state to 
which the obligation is owed (or as non-injured s tate(s) acting in the wider common 
interest), from invoking the responsibility of a developed state (or several states) under the 
inter-state procedure (subject to a declaration recognising the competence of the Committee 
to receive communications), for non-compliance with its negative and positive international 
obligations. In the former case, a developing country could submit a communication 
claiming that other state parties (or another state party) are not meeting their obligations of 
international assistance by failing to contribute ‘the maximum of its available resources’ 
towards the socio-economic rights of its people.65 Further, a developing country could 
61 CESCR, ‘Statement on Poverty and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ 
(25th Sess., 2001), UN Doc. E/C.12/2001/10 (2001), para. 4. 
62 Optional Protocol to ICESCR, n. 45. 
63 Ibid., Article 10. 
64 Ibid., Articles 11 and 12. 
65 As discussed above and further see, Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States, n. 33, 
Principle 33: ‘[a]s part of the broader obligation of international cooperation, States, acting separately and 
jointly, that are in a position to do so, must provide international assistance to contribute to the fulfilment of 
economic, social and cultural rights in other States.’ 
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submit a communication claiming that other s tate parties (or another s tate party) are not 
taking the necessary steps, separately, and jointly through international cooperation, to create 
an international enabling environment conducive to the universal fulfilment of economic, 
social and cultural rights by failing to elaborate or review multilateral and bilateral 
agreements, so as to render them consistent with international human rights standards.66 As 
for concerns pertaining to grave or systematic violations under the inquiry procedure, where 
the Committee is granted competence it should have no shortage of issues to examine in a 
world where the realisation of human rights is being brought to its knees by food, financial 
and environmental crises. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
As a matter of positive international human rights law obligations of international assistance 
and cooperation are not discretionary. But unless we begin to see delineated what is required, 
when, and by which state(s), they may as well be voluntary. While this Chapter has only 
scratched the surface as to how we might think about establishing international responsibility 
in a world of great deprivations where duties to confront need extend beyond the right-holders 
own state, it is clear that our doctrines and mechanisms are hardly fit for purpose. A 
thoughtful commentator remarked recently that the biggest blind spot in global human rights 
is the political economy,67 it is high time this changed or justice will continue to evade us. 
 
 
66 Ibid., Principle 29. 




                                                          
